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Abstract
In this article we present quasi-experimental evidence on the relation between
child care subsidies and child care quality. We exploit the difference in fund-
ing of private and public centers in the Netherlands. A recent subsidy cut
reduced funding for private centers while funding for public centers was unaf-
fected. The quality measurements are from a panel survey in which centers’
quality was evaluated through classroom assessments by trained observers.
Using differences-in-differences we find that the subsidy reduction caused a
statistically significant decrease in quality of one fifth of a standard deviation.
We also present results for nonlinear differences-in-differences estimators. The
decline in quality is robust across specifications and appears to be driven by a
decline in the middle of the distribution. A limitation of our data set is that
our pre-reform period is short, so that we can not perform pre-reform placebo
tests.
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1 Introduction
The past decades have witnessed a strong rise in the enrollment of children in child
care and preschool programs, following the rise in maternal employment and the
increased availability and generosity of these programs. As a result, an increasing
number of children are exposed to formal care with different levels of quality. Recent
studies have shown that the quality of formal care is important for child development.
Indeed, good quality care leads to more favorable outcomes later in life in terms of
cognitive-academic achievements (Vandell et al., 2010), and employment, wage and
crime rates (Heckman et al., 2010; Havnes and Mogstad, 2011). However, not all
child care is of sufficiently good quality to raise child development, as evidenced
by a number of studies that find a negative effect of child care attendance on child
development (Baker et al., 2008; Datta Gupta and Simonsen, 2010; Herbst, 2013).
Using a number of instruments, governments seek to promote good quality care.
Indeed, governments set and enforce minimum standards for child-staff ratio’s and
the educational attainment of caregivers. However, these variables generally do
not appear to be closely related to either the quality of care or child development
(Blau, 1997, 1999, 2000). Another important policy that may influence formal care
quality is subsidies to formal care, which may be an important resource for enhancing
the quality of formal care. However, the extent to which subsidies to formal care
affect the quality of formal care is largely unknown. Indeed, only a few, recent
papers consider the effect of subsidies on care quality (Herbst and Tekin, 2010;
Johnson et al., 2012). However, these studies rely on cross-sectional variation for
identification, which raises concerns about whether or not they uncover a causal
relation.
In this paper we use differences-in-differences (DID) to uncover the impact of
child care subsidies on the quality of child care. Specifically, we study the effects of
the 2012 subsidy cut for private child care centers in the Netherlands on the quality
of these centers, using public child care centers, that were not affected by the reform,
as a control group.
The two-tiered child care system in the Netherlands, where private and public
child care centers coexist, allows for our quasi-experimental identification strategy.
The treatment group consists of the private child care centers that were affected
by the subsidy cuts from the central government. The control group consists of
2
public child care centers, financed by municipalities, that were not affected by the
subsidy cuts. We supplement the results of the linear DID model with estimates us-
ing quantile regression, changes-in-changes and recentered influence function models
(Athey and Imbens, 2006; Firpo et al., 2009), which allow us to study heterogeneous
treatment effects across the quality distribution. Our data come from the Pre-Cool
survey, a two-wave, geographically-representative survey of child care centers in the
Netherlands. The Pre-Cool survey has a panel structure, with most centers visited
in both waves. The first wave of the survey was collected before the subsidy cut, the
second wave was collected after the subsidy cut. The Pre-Cool survey focusses on
the process quality of child care. Process quality can be broadly defined as measur-
ing the quality of children’s experiences in classrooms, particularly with regards to
social and cognitive development (Blau, 2000). Process quality is measured through
observations by trained personnel in centers’ classrooms according to the Classroom
Assessment and Scoring System (CLASS), a standardized assessment tool. This
quality measure has been shown to be closely linked to child development.1
Our main findings are as follows. First, our baseline estimate for the average
treatment effect shows that the cut in subsidies caused a statistically significant
drop in average child care quality of one fifth of a standard deviation. Second, we
find that the drop is primarily in the following elements of quality: i) regard for child
perspectives, ii) behavior guidance, iii) facilitation of learning and development and
iv) the quality of feedback. Third, the drop in quality appears to be driven by a
decline in the middle of the quality distribution.
There are only a few empirical studies that analyze the link between child care
subsidies and child care quality. Johnson et al. (2012) study the effect of subsidy
receipt on child care quality for a cross-section of families with children 4 years of age
in the US. Their treatment group consists of families that are eligible for child care
subsidies and receive them. Their control group consists of families that are eligible
for child care subsidies but do not receive them. Selection into subsidies is related
to education and income levels of families, both because parents’ own self-selection
and administration agencies’ targeting particular groups more agressively. They find
that the process quality of child care is significantly higher for children of families
that receive child care subsidies when compared to parents who do not receive child
1See Pianta et al. (2008) for a description of the CLASS methodology, and Pakarinen et al.
(2010) for a recent validation.
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care subsidies (and that do not participate in other public programs like Head Start),
in the order of one third of a standard deviation. Herbst and Tekin (2010) study
the relation between the receipt of child care subsidies and child development across
counties in the US. They use data on cognitive, behavioral and physical development
outcomes to measure the effect of receiving child care subsidies. They use county
fixed effects as an instrument for the probability of receiving child care subsidies.
They find that subsidy receipt results in a significant reduction of one quarter to
one third of a standard deviation in math and reading scores. They argue that this
negative effect may be due to families receiving child care subsidies purchasing lower
quality care.
However, determining a causal effect of child care subsidies on child care qual-
ity using cross-sectional data is tricky. The descriptive statistics in Johnson et al.
(2012) show substantial differences between the treatment and control group in e.g.
the probability of the mother being in fulltime employment and household income.
They do control for an extensive set of observable differences between treatment
and control group, but this does not rule out unobservable differences between both
groups that might also lead to a relation between the receipt of child care subsidies
and child care quality. The instrument used by Herbst and Tekin (2010) captures
differences in the receipt of child care subsidies across counties, but may also capture
other differences across counties that may lead to a relation between the receipt of
child care subsidies and child development beyond the county policy indicators they
control for. We believe that the targeted reform in the Netherlands generates cred-
ible exogenous variation in child care subsidies. Combined with the panel structure
of our data, so that we can control for unobserved fixed differences in child care qual-
ity between the treatment and control group, this allows for a more straightforward
identification of the causal effect of child care subsidies on child care quality.
The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 considers the institutional
setup of child care in the Netherlands and the reform we use as exogenous variation.
Section 3 outlines our empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the data set used
and gives some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6
concludes. An appendix contains supplementary material.
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2 Institutional setting
The two-tiered structure of the Dutch child care sector is central to our identification
strategy. Formal child care centers in the Netherlands can be divided into private
daycare centers (kinderdagverblijf ) and public playgroups (peuterspeelzaal). Daycare
centers are typically used by dual-income families and working single parents and
can cover enough hours for fulltime employment.2 Playgroups provide ‘parttime’
care, between two and four half days per week, and are also used by families where
one or more parents are not working. Both center types essentially provide the same
child care services in terms of quality though (see the data section below).
Daycare centers operate in a private market and parents are free to choose the
daycare center they prefer.3 Child care subsidies are paid to parents by the central
government. Subsidies are paid per hour of care, up to a maximum price per hour
beyond which parents receive no (additional) subsidy. The subsidy depends on
income, with low incomes receiving a larger subsidy per hour than high incomes.
The subsidy per child per hour also depends on the number of children in daycare
per household; the subsidy is higher for the second (third etc.) child in daycare.
In the period 2005–2008, there was a boost in the daycare sector, as subsidies for
parents were increased substantially, cutting the effective parental fee for formal
child care in half (Bettendorf et al., 2015). However, the reform was so succesful
in terms of the use of formal child care that it increased public spending on formal
child care from 1 billion euro in 2004 to 3 billion euro in 2009. This strong increase
in public spending on child care, and the need for budget cuts following the financial
crisis, led the government to curb public spending on child care.
In 2011 the government announced a substantial reduction in child care subsidies,
which came into effect in 2012 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2011).
The change in subsidies in 2012 is illustrated in Figure 1. Subsidy rates were cut
across the board for the first child by between 2 to 5 percentage points, while subsidy
rates for the second (third etc.) child were reduced by more than 10 percentage
2In principle, daycare subsidies are paid only to working single parents and couples with children
where both parents are working. However, parents that recently became unemployed remain
eligible for daycare subsidies for a period of three months. Furthermore, parents participating in
active labor market policies are also eligible for daycare subsidies.
3Waiting lists are of limited importance in the Netherlands (Van Rens and Smit, 2011).
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Figure 1: Subsidy rates for first and second child in daycare centers
Source: Tax Office.
Figure 2: Number of children in daycare centers and playgroups (x1000)
Source: Statistics Netherlands.
points depending on income.4 Appendix A illustrates how these changes affected
the net monthly expenditures on daycare for different family configurations (single
parents and couples with young children), income levels and number of children in
daycare. The increase in the parental fee was around 20, 40 and 50% for parents with
one child, two children and three children in daycare, respectively. The increase in
the parental fee was larger in absolute terms for middle and higher income families.
The subsidy reduction led to a negative demand shock for daycare. Indeed, 2012
is the first year since the introduction of the Law on Childcare (Wet kinderopvang)
in 2005, in which hourly daycare prices rose less than the core inflation rate. Fur-
thermore, after a steady rise up to 2011, the number of children in daycare declined
by 3.5% from 2011 to 2012, see Figure 2. To remain solvent, the negative demand
shock put pressure on daycare centers to cut costs. Our analysis shows that these
cost savings led to a decrease in the process quality of child care. Parents may
have been largely unaware of the reduction in quality, as the quality of child care is
notoriously hard to determine by parents (Mocan, 2007).5
Playgroups were not affected by this subsidy cut. Playgroups are funded directly
by municipalities, with minor parental contributions. Playgroups may have been
affected by the recession in the Netherlands, but the same is true for daycare centers,
regardless of the subsidy cuts. Furthermore, the austerity measures on the national
level do not appear to have led to budget cuts for playgroups on the municipality
level. This is supported by the fact that the number of pupils in playgroups has
remained rather stable, see Figure 2, as opposed to the reversal of the growth of
children in daycare centers. This supports our use of playgroups as the control group
in our empirical analysis.
Both daycare centers and playgroups are regulated in terms of structural quality
factors such as child-staff ratio’s, educational attainment of caregivers and space
4In addition to the reduction in subsidies up to the maximum hourly price, the maximum hourly
price was also kept constant (was not indexed with inflation) at e 6.36 from 2011 to 2012. The
average hourly price of formal child care rose from e 6.32 in 2011 to e 6.45 in 2012 (Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, 2013). This further increased the effective costs of child care for
parents from 2011 to 2012.
5A negative demand shock could potentially increase average quality, when the centers with
the lowest quality drop out of the market. However, this mechanism seems less relevant in our
case, the quality of daycare centers observed in wave 1 and not observed in wave 2 is similar to
the quality of daycare centers observed in both waves, see Table A.2 in the appendix.
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specifications. Municipalities further inspect daycare centers on whether they com-
ply with the quality regulations agreed upon by parental organizations and daycare
providers. Playgroups are inspected by municipalities to check if they comply with
the quality regulations set by national law. In addition, both center types need to
pass the inspection of the Municipality Health Service (Gemeentelijke Gezondshei-
dsdienst) on e.g. fire safety, for parents of children in daycare centers to be eligible
for subsidies and for managers of playgroups to receive funding.
3 Empirical methodology
To estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of the subsidy reduction on child care
quality we use a linear differences-in-differences (DID) model (see e.g. Angrist and
Pischke, 2008). The DID model relies on the difference in quality of daycare centers
and playgroups before the reform and after the reform. By taking the difference
of the difference, the DID model controls for fixed differences in quality between
daycare centers and playgroups, and for common time effects in the quality in both
center types.
We use the group (center type) dummy βg to indicate to which type of care
the classroom observation belongs, which is 0 for playgroups and 1 for daycare. βt
indicates the wave of the observation, which is 0 for the first wave and 1 for the
second wave. The treatment dummy follows from the interaction of the group and
the wave dummy DIDgt = βg ∗ βt, which is 1 if the observation is from daycare and
from the second wave, and 0 otherwise. We assume that quality yijt for classroom i
of center j in period t is then determined by the following linear DID model:
yijt = β0 + βg + βt + δDIDgt + βm + βj + εijt, (1)
where the parameter of interest is δ.6 We add two sets of additional controls.7 The
βm are time fixed effects for each month-year combination, to capture quality dif-
ferences between different months in different years, assumed constant across center
6For notational convenience, we suppress a coefficient for the other dummies in the regression.
7We further test the robustness of the estimates for the inclusion of the number of children and
the number of staff per group. However, we prefer to exclude these controls from the regression as
they are likely to be endogenous.
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types. The βj are center fixed effects, which capture constant quality differences
across centers.8 εijt is an error term whose structure is discussed below.
Next, we estimate models that take into account the shift in the full distribution
of quality values. These nonlinear models relax the additivity assumption of the
DID model. We first estimate a quantile differences-in-differences (QDID) model.
In the QDID model the treatment effects are estimated for separate quantiles. The
QDID allows us to estimate equation (1) for each quantile while including month
and center fixed effects.
Subsequently, we implement the changes-in-changes (CIC) model of Athey and
Imbens (2006). In the CIC model, the distribution of quality in the treatment and
control groups are assumed to be generated by a ‘production function’ Y = hI(u, t),
where u are unobserved characteristics at time t, and I is an indicator for treatment.
The restriction on the production functions h for the treatment and control groups is
that they are monotonic and increasing in u. The treatment effect for each quantile
is determined in the following way. Take a particular quality level in the treatment
group in the first wave Y10 (where 1 indicates the treatment group, and 0 indicates
the first wave) and determine its associated quantile q. Next, find the quantile q′ in
the control group that has the same quality level Y00 = Y10 in the first wave. Then,
find the second wave value Y01 for the quantile q
′ in the control group. Finally, to
obtain the treatment effect for quantile q in the treatment group, take the difference
in quality Y01 − Y00 for quantile q′ in the control group, and subtract this from
the difference in quality Y11 − Y10 for quantile q in the treatment group. Indeed,
Athey and Imbens (2006) show that the complete counterfactual distribution of the
treatment group FY N (where I = N indicates no treatment) can be obtained using:
FY N (y) = FY10(F
−1
Y00
(FY01(y))). (2)
Finally, we apply the recentered influence function method of Firpo et al. (2009).
They show that the unconditional quantile regression can be redefined as a linear
regression where the dependent variable is the probability that an observed outcome
is greater than a given level. We follow the application of the recentered influence
function method by Havnes and Mogstad (2015) who use a threshold differences-
in-differences (TDID) model. We can determine the effect of the subsidy reduction
8We can not use classroom fixed effects because we do not have a panel identifier for classrooms,
only for centers.
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TDIDi on the possibility that the observed quality yijt is greater than the quality
level y′ by estimating (using ordinary least squares):
Pr(yijt > y
′) = γ0y′ + γgy′ + γty′ + δy′TDIDgt + γmy′ + cjy′ + υijt. (3)
As discussed in more detail in Havnes and Mogstad (2015), the advantage of
the CIC and TDID model over the QDID model is that they take into account the
full change in the distribution of outcomes for the treatment and control group.
The QDID model ‘simply’ gives the differences-in-differences value using the same
quantiles in the treatment and control group. The CIC model instead determines
the treatment effect using as a counterfactual not the same quantile, but the quan-
tile corresponding to the same level of initial quality (treatment and control units
are comparable in terms of initial outcomes rather than the initial position in the
cumulative distribution). The TDID model takes an approach related to the CIC
model by first finding the corresponding quantile in the control group that has the
same level as initial level of quality, but then looks at the change in the proportion
of the samples before and after the treatment to calculate the treatment effect.
For each nonlinear model we can also calculate an average treatment effect by
averaging the differences between the realized distribution of the treatment group
and the counterfactual distribution. There can be noticeable difference between the
average treatment effect from the linear and nonlinear DID models, dependening on
the heterogeneity in the outcomes (Ropponen, 2011).
For the linear DID model we report standard errors clustered at the center-wave
level, to allow for a correlation in the error term at the center-wave level (the level
of treatment).9 This gives us 260 clusters, which is deemed sufficient for accurate
inference, based on the large-sample properties of the estimator.10 For the nonlinear
9Failure to account for correlation in the error term across observations at the cluster level,
within and between periods, can cause overrejection in DID estimates (Bertrand et al., 2004;
Donald and Lang, 2007). Indeed, we find that the clustered standard errors are larger than the
robust standard errors.
10Ke´zdi (2004) explores the small-sample properties of cluster-robust standard errors in fixed
effects models using Monte Carlo methods. For a number of data generating processes he estimates
the sample distribution of the standard error of the parameter of interest, based on 10,000 samples
for different numbers of clusters (10, 50 and 500). He concludes that when the number of clusters
is 50, the relative deviation between the asymptotic standard error and the estimated standard
error never exceeds 5%. For 10 clusters, the error in some cases rises to 16%.
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estimators we can not use clustered standard errors and report robust standard
errors instead.
An important limitation of our data set is that we can not test the validity of
common time effects, using e.g. placebo reform dummies in pre-reform years. We
have observations of just two years in our data set, one year before the reform and
one year after the reform. If there are differential trends in the quality of daycare
centers and playgroups, our treatment dummy will be biased. What do we know
about a potential trend in the quality of each center type? The Dutch Consortium
for Childcare Research (NCKO) has been measuring the quality of daycare centers
in the Netherlands using the ECERS-K methodology since 1995. In 1995 the average
quality was 4.8 (on a scale from 1 (bad) to 7 (excellent)). Following the increase in
places in daycare centers, quality dropped to 4.3 in 2001 and to 3.6 in 2005. After
2005, subsidies for daycare became much more generous, causing a rapid expansion.
Quality dropped to a meagre 3.0 in 2008. Over the period 2008–2011, the growth in
daycare places leveled off, and 2012 witnessed a decline following the subsidy cut.
During this period, average quality as measured by the ECERS-K scale recovered
to 4.3 in 2012 (no observations using ECERS-K were made between 2008 and 2012)
(NCKO, 2013). Hence, if there was a trend in daycare quality during our data
period, unrelated to the reform, it is likely to have been positive. Unfortunately, for
playgroups there is no measurement of quality prior to our data period. However,
since there were no significant changes in the enrollment or funding of playgroups
in the years up to the reform, it is unlikely that there was a trend in the quality
of playgroups. Below we estimate a negative treatment effect of the subsidy cut on
the quality of daycare centers. The considerations above suggest that this is more
likely to be an underestimate than an overestimate (in absolute terms) of the effect
of the subsidy cut on the quality of daycare centers.
4 Data
The data on child care quality comes from the longitudinal Pre-Cool survey of Dutch
child care centers, parents and children. The Pre-Cool survey consists currently of
two waves, one collected in 2010 and 2011 and the other in 2012.11 The primary
11Future waves of Pre-Cool will track the children in primary schools, there will be no new
observations on the quality of child care in the survey.
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Table 1: Quality indicators before and after subsidy reduction
Daycare Playgroups DID w/o
Before After Before After controls
Process quality indicators
Overall quality 4.052 3.529 4.304 3.953 –0.172
(0.863) (0.675) (0.910) (0.680)
- Emotional support 5.011 4.446 5.054 4.636 –0.147
(0.855) (0.736) (0.865) (0.699)
- Instructional support 3.093 2.611 3.554 3.270 –0.198
(1.072) (0.800) (1.145) (0.824)
Structural quality indicators
Child-to-staff ratio 5.323 5.165 4.881 5.112 –0.389
(2.092) (2.129) (2.124) (2.224)
Observations 392 355 466 411
Number of centers 53 53 77 77
Standard deviations in parentheses.
purpose of the Pre-Cool survey is to track the development of Dutch children.
The unit of analysis in our study is an individual group/classroom in daycare
centers or playgroups. The Pre-Cool survey involved sending trained observers to
measure the quality of classrooms. The average observation period was about 20
minutes for each classroom, and observations are made for multiple classrooms in
each center. We use a balanced panel of 130 daycare centers and playgroups for which
we have complete data for the analysis.12 The centers used in the analysis are from
38 geographically-representative municipalities (see Figure A.1 in the appendix).
Quality is measured using the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS),
developed by developmental psychologists. Measures like CLASS are said to mea-
12The full sample consists of 166 centers, of which 36 centers had to be dropped because of
missing data. We increased the sample to 157 centers with an unbalanced panel and estimated the
base regression without center and municipality fixed effects. The results show that the negative
effects are more significant and larger (in absolute terms) by up to –0.05. The average quality
indicators of centers that are observed only in the first wave are presented in Table A.2 in the
appendix.
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sure what is called ‘process quality’ or the quality of the child-caregiver interaction
in the classroom. Multiple studies confirm that process quality measurements using
CLASS are positively associated with development outcomes (Mashburn et al., 2008;
Sabol et al., 2013). Furthermore, Sabol et al. (2013) find CLASS to be the strongest
predictor of child learning outcomes compared to ECERS-R and structural indi-
cators such as staff-to-child ratios. CLASS consists of two domains: instructional
support and emotional support. Each domain is made up of several dimensions on
which the observers grade the classroom interaction. The emotional support dimen-
sions13 are: i) positive climate, ii) teacher sensitivity, iii) behavior guidance, and
iv) regard for child perspectives. Instructional support consists of: i) facilitation
of learning and development, ii) quality of feedback, and iii) language development.
Each dimension is graded by the observer on a discrete scale from 1 (low) to 7 (high).
The average quality for each domain is constructed by simply taking the means of
the dimensions, and the overall quality score is the mean of the two domain scores.14
Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics for the quality indicators for daycare
centers and playgroups in wave 1 (‘Before’) and wave 2 (‘After’). The wave 1 obser-
vations were made in late 2010 and early 2011.15 The wave 2 observations were made
in 2012.16 The average score for overall quality in the pre-reform period is around
4 for both daycare centers and for playgroups. For both child care types scores are
higher for the emotional support domain than for the instructional support domain.
13An additional dimension named ‘Negative climate’ is collected but has low variation, is coded
in reverse (1 being highest as opposed to 7) and its effect should be captured by the positive climate
measure. Pakarinen et al. (2010) found a similarly low variation in Finland for the negative climate
dimension and concluded that CLASS measures are a better predictor of classroom quality when
negative climate is excluded. For the Pre-Cool survey, Leseman and Slot (2014) report a low
variation for the negative climate measure, since almost all classrooms score very low on it.
14In development psychology factor analysis is sometimes used to construct quality scores, but
we use the means in our regressions because they are easier to interpret. As a robustness check
we used factor analysis to construct average domain scores. The factor loadings appear to be
around 0.7 for all dimensions except the ‘Regard for child perspectives’ dimension which has a
factor loading of 0.34. The estimated treatment effects when domain factor scores are used are
similar to the effects on domain averages, with a larger effect for the instructional support domain
compared to the emotional support domain. Further details available on request.
15Excluding the 13 centers whose wave 1 observations were made in 2010 does not affect the
estimated average treatment effect, but reduces the statistical power of the regressions.
16In total, we have observations from 15 different months over the years 2010–2012, for which
we include time fixed effects in the regressions.
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Figure 3: Distribution of overall quality in daycare centers
Figure 4: Distribution of overall quality in playgroups
Post-treatment scores are lower for both daycare centers and playgroups, but the
drop in scores is more pronounced for daycare centers. The drop is most visible
in the instructional support domain. A simple differences-in-differences calculation,
using only group averages for the treatment and control group before and after the
reform, suggests an average treatment effect of –0.172 for overall quality. The effect
appears somewhat lower for emotional support (–0.147) and somewhat higher for
instructional support (–0.198).
Looking at the structural quality indicator, we see a small drop in the child-
to-staff ratio for daycare centers, and a small rise in the child-to-staff ratio for
playgroups. A simple DID calculation suggests a drop in the child-to-staff ratio in
daycare centers relative to playgroups by –0.389 points.
Next to the means we are also interested in changes in the full distribution of
quality in daycare centers and playgroups. Figure 3 and 4 show a kernel density
estimate of the distribution of the quality scores before and after the reform per child
care type. In wave 1, the quality score distribution is quite similar for playgroups
and daycare centers, though the top of the quality distribution for daycare centers
appears somewhat wider. In wave 2, the quality distribution of daycare centers shifts
noticeably more to the left than the quality distribution of playgroups. Furthermore,
the top of the quality distribution for daycare centers becomes more ‘peaked’ after
the reform.
5 Results
5.1 Average treatment effect
Table 2 gives the average treatment effect on overall quality, for different sets of
controls. Column (1) gives the treatment effect using only a group dummy and
one time dummy (for the wave). This model gives a drop in overall quality of –
0.172 points. In column (2) we replace the single time dummy by year-month fixed
effects to control for the timing of the observation over the year. The treatment
effect drops to –0.194. In column (3) we add municipality fixed effects in order to
control for heterogeneity in local child care markets, which causes a further drop in
the treatment effect to –0.222. Column (4) then adds fixed effects for municipality
interacted with center type (daycare/playgroup), to control for heterogeneity in local
Table 2: Average treatment effect on overall quality
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall quality –0.1725 –0.1942 –0.2216 –0.2242 –0.2124
(0.1424) (0.1402) (0.1313)* (0.1193)* (0.0953)**
Time controls Wave Year-month Year-month Year-month Year-month
Municipality FE No No Yes No No
Munic. x center type FE No No No Yes No
Center FE No No No No Yes
Observations 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624 1,624
Number of centers 130 130 130 130 130
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by center-wave in parentheses (260
clusters).
markets by center type. The results are similar to column (3). Finally, column (5)
adds center fixed effects for each individuals center. The treatment effect of –0.212
is similar to the models in column (3) and (4). The model in column (5) is our
preferred specification because it is the most flexible in terms of the distribution of
the unobserved fixed effects.17
The negative treatment effect on overall quality of around 0.2 is one third of
a standard deviation. For the US, Duncan (2003) finds that a reduction of one
standard deviation in process quality is associated with a decrease of one tenth of
a standard deviation in cognitive scores for small children. If the relation between
child care quality and child development in the Netherlands is similar to the US, the
subsidy reduction would have decreased cognitive development of Dutch children
attending daycare by about 3% of a standard deviation.
Table 3 shows which elements of quality drive the drop in quality. The individual
elements are grouped into elements of the emotional support domain and elements
of the instructional support domain. The coefficients are negative for all elements.
In the emotional support domain, the drop is larger and more significant in the items
‘Regard for child perspective’ and ’Behavior guidance’. In the instructional support
domain, the effect is larger for ‘Quality of feedback’ and in particular for ‘Facilita-
tion of learning and development’. Previous studies have shown that instructional
17When we include the child-to-staff ratio as an additional control variable in the model of
column (5) the treatment effect is quite similar (–0.216).
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Table 3: Average treatment effect on single elements of quality
Average treatment effect
Overall quality –0.2124
(0.0953)**
- Emotional support –0.1743
(0.0924)*
- - Positive climate –0.0549
(0.1151)
- - Teacher sensitivity –0.1244
(0.1170)
- - Regard for child perspectives –0.2569
(0.1157)**
- - Behavior guidance –0.2609
(0.1152)**
- Instructional support –0.2505
(0.1177)**
- - Facilitation of learning and development –0.4509
(0.1301)***
- - Quality of feedback –0.2348
(0.1212)*
- - Language development –0.0660
(0.1471)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by center-wave in
parentheses. All regressions include year-month and center fixed effects.
Table 4: Average treatment effect structural quality indicators
Average treatment effect
Number of children –0.9734
(0.4051)**
Number of adults –0.1247
(0.0923)
Child-to-staff ratio –0.2182
(0.2398)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered by center-wave
in parentheses. All regressions include year-month and center fixed effects.
Data is from 130 centers, as in the process quality regressions. However,
in the structural quality regressions 10 classroom observations had to be
dropped due to missing data on the number of children and/or the number
of staff.
support measures are particularly important for school readiness (Mashburn et al.,
2008). Noting that the scores for instructional support were already lower to begin
with, a further decrease seems more likely to have negative consequences on child
development.
Table 4 gives the average treatment effect on the structural quality indicator
in our data set, the child-to-staff ratio. The drop in demand for daycare led to a
drop in the child-to-staff ratio in daycare centers relative to playgroups. One might
have expected that this would cause an increase rather than a decrease in child care
quality. However, studies have shown that structural quality indicators are not a
very good predictor of the quality of care or child development (Blau, 1997, 1999,
2000). Hence, we prefer to look at the treatment effects on the indicators of process
quality considered above.
5.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects
Next, we consider which part of the quality distribution was most affected by the
reform. Figure 3 and 4 reveal important differences in the shift of the quality
distribution of daycare centers relative to playgroups. Table 5 gives the quantile
treatment effects at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th quantile, along with the
treatment effect averaged over all quantiles. A plot of the quantile effects for the
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Table 5: Treatment effects by quality quantiles
ATE Quantile treatment effect
Quantile 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
QDID
Treatment effect -0.1942 –0.2500 –0.2083 –0.2500 –0.3333 –0.1250
Robust s.e. (0.0786)** (0.1192)** (0.0944)** (0.0973)** (0.1022)*** (0.1440))
CIC
Treatment effect –0.2217 –0.1250 –0.2917 –0.2500 –0.3333 –0.1667
Bootstrapped s.e. (0.0660)*** (0.1063) (0.1169)** (0.1065)** (0.0957)*** (0.0850)**
TDID
Treatment effect –0.2124 –0.1786 –0.4715 –0.3522 –0.2211 0.0471
Robust s.e. (0.0712)*** (0.1307) (0.1031)*** (0.1035)*** (0.1076)** (0.1365)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We use 200 repetitions for the bootstrapped standard errors in the CIC
model. The QDID includes year-month fixed effects. The TDID model includes year-month fixed effects
and center fixed effects.
different nonlinear estimators is given in Figure 5, 6 and 7.
The average treatment effect of the nonlinear models is very similar to the es-
timates from the linear model. However, there appear to be substantial differences
by quantiles, though the treatment effects by quantile are typically not significantly
different from the average treatment effect. The treatment effects by quantiles sug-
gest that the effects are larger in the middle of the quality distribution, especially
when using the CIC and TDID models. The QDID model suggests that the ef-
fects are strong also at the bottom of the quality distribution, but this is comparing
treatment and control units by initial quantile, not by initial quality level.
A possible explanation for the relatively small drop in quality at the bottom of
the quality distribution may be that these child care centers are used mostly by low
income families. The increase in the parental fee was targeted more at middle and
high income families than at low income families. Another possible explanation for
the relatively small drop in quality at the bottom of the quality distribution may be
that low quality child care centers simply do not have any more room to cut costs
and lower quality given the current regulations.
The small drop in quality at the top of the distribution may reflect that high
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Figure 5: Quantile effects - QDID
Figure 6: Quantile effects - CIC
Figure 7: Quantile effects - TDID
quality centers are catering to parents with strong tastes for high quality child care,
and these parents perhaps respond more strongly to a drop in child care quality
than a rise in the effective hourly price.
6 Conclusions
The quality of child care is an important element of child care policy design. How-
ever, the impact of child care subsidies on child care quality is largely unknown. We
present quasi-experimental evidence on the relation between child care subsidies and
child care quality, using a recent reform in the Netherlands. The two-tiered child
care system in the Netherlands, where private daycare centers (treatment group)
and public playgroups (control group) coexist, allows for an identification of the
causal effect using differences-in-differences. The results show that the quality in
Dutch daycare centers declined as a result of the subsidy cut, by about one third of a
standard deviation. Prior trends in daycare quality suggests that our results might
even be underestimating the decline in quality caused by the subsidy reduction. We
also consider the heterogeneity in the treatment effect using nonlinear models, our
findings suggest that the decline in quality is strongest in the middle of the qual-
ity distribution, though the effects are typically not statistically different from the
average treatment effect.
In the wake of the financial crisis, fiscal consolidation and austerity have led to
cuts in public spending on child care and related programs. In the US, the 2013
budget sequestration resulted in cuts in the budget for the Head Start Program.
In the Netherlands, there was a substantial reduction in subsidies for parents using
formal child care in 2012. Many other European countries are also engaged in
austerity measures to lower the public debt, and spending on child care and related
programs is unlikely to be immune to these cuts in these countries as well. Our
paper shows that for a complete picture or the pros and cons of cuts in public
spending on these programs, policymakers should consider not only the effects on
e.g. maternal employment, but should also consider the effects on the quality of
care, as the quality of care is an important determinant of child development.
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Appendix
Change in child care costs for families
Table A.1 shows the increase in child care costs for families with one, two or three
children in daycare. We calculate child care costs for single parents and couples
using three days of daycare per week. For single parents we calculate child care
costs at median income. For couples we calculate child care costs at 150% and 200%
of median income. The table shows that child care costs have increased by by 26%
for single parent families with one child and the increase is 46% for two and 58% for
three children. Child care costs rose more for higher income families, even though
the percent change is lower due to the higher base cost in 2011. For couples with
150% of the median income, the percent change is between 23% and 52% depending
on the number of children. The increases are similar for couples with 200% of the
median income with an increase if 21% for parents with one child in daycare and
52% for those with three.
Table A.1: Child care costs of households in 2011 and 2012 (in euro)
2011 2012 Percentage
Income Net cost Income Net cost change in net cost
Single parent, median income
One child 32,500 120 33,150 152 +26
Two children 32,500 155 33,150 226 +46
Three children 32,500 190 49,725 301 +58
Couple, 1.5x median income
One child 48,750 183 49,725 225 +23
Two children 48,750 227 49,725 323 +42
Three children 48,750 271 49,725 422 +52
Couple, 2x median income
One child 65,000 278 66,300 336 +21
Two children 65,000 332 66,300 461 +39
Three children 65,000 385 66,300 586 +52
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Figure A.1: Number of class observations per municipality
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Table A.2: Summary statistics for centers missing in wave 2
In both waves First wave only
Daycare Playgroup Daycare Playgroup
Process quality indicators
Overall quality 4.052 4.304 4.017 3.957
(0.863) (0.910) (0.657) (0.830)
- Emotional support 5.011 5.054 5.048 4.874
(0.855) (0.865) (0.682) (0.919)
- Instructional support 3.093 3.554 2.985 3.040
(1.072) (1.145) (0.904) (0.935)
Structural quality indicators
Child-to-staff ratio 5.323 5.165 5.094 4.990
(2.092) (2.129) (1.855) (2.021)
Observations 392 466 88 92
# of centers 53 77 11 16
Standard deviations in parentheses.

